AUDIT_REMOTE(7)      Standards, Environments, and Macros     AUDIT_REMOTE(7)
NAME
       audit_remote - send audit logs to a remote server
SYNOPSIS
       /usr/lib/security/audit_remote.soDESCRIPTION
       The 
audit_remote plugin module for audit,       
/usr/lib/security/audit_remote.so, sends binary audit records
       (
audit.log(5)) to audit servers specified in the plugin's attributes
       configured by 
auditconfig(8).
   Object Attributes
       The following attributes specify the configuration of the       
audit_remote plugin:       
p_hosts             host1[:[
port1][:
mech1]][,
host2[:[
port2][:
mech2]],... \                 
hostn[:[
portn][:
mechn]]]
           A list of audit hosts/servers. Audit records are sent to the
           first available host. If a host is unreachable or a timeout
           occurs while sending data, the next host in the list is tried. If
           connection to all hosts fails, the list is tried again from the
           beginning.
           The 
host part of a 
p_hosts entry can be in any form acceptable to           
getipnodebyname(3SOCKET).
           The 
port part of a 
p_hosts entry is the port on host that is
           contacted to initiate an audit server connection. If not
           specified, the port number is that assigned to the 
solaris-audit           service. See 
getservbyname(3XNET).
           The 
mech part of a 
p_host entry is the GSS-API mechanism name
           (
mech(5)). If not specified, the local host's default mechanism
           is used.  The recommended mechanism is 
kerberos_v5.       
p_retries           The number of retries for connecting to and sending data to a
           server.
           The default value is 
3.       
p_timeout           The number of seconds in which a connection/sending data
           timeouts.
           The default value is 
5 seconds.       
qsize           The maximum number of outstanding audit records to keep.
           The default is the value of the kernel queue control high water
           mark. See 
auditconfig(8).
   GSS SESSION
       The 
audit_remote plugin is a TCP client that authenticates configured
       audit servers using the GSS-API (
libgss(3LIB)). Binary Audit records
       are sent with integrity and confidentiality protection as per-message
       tokens generated by 
gss_wrap(3GSS).
       The plugin initiates a TCP connection to an audit server
       (
host:port:mech) and establishes a GSS security context (with       
gss_init_sec_context(3GSS)), with appropriate security mechanism
       (
mech(5)).
       If no port is specified, the service name 
solaris-audit is looked up
       to obtain a TCP port number. If no mechanism is specified, the       
GSS_C_NO_OID is used as a 
mech_type parameter of       
gss_init_sec_context(3GSS), and causes the underlying 
GSS-API to use
       the local default mechanism.       
gss_init_sec_context(3GSS) uses 
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL as the initiator
       credential handle and a target name of the form 
audit@<ost_fqdn>. The
       server is expected to use 
gss_accept_sec_context(3GSS) to complete
       the context establishment.
       Once the security context is established, the client (
audit_remote       plugin) calls 
gss_wrap(3GSS) to achieve the confidentiality of the
       transferred payload - the audit records. The server is expected to
       use 
gss_unwrap(3GSS) to unwrap the received data and       
gss_get_mic(3GSS) to obtain the MIC (Message Integrity Code) to be
       later sent back to the plugin as a message retrieval acknowledgment.
       For example, if the 
kerberos_v5 mechanism is configured as 
GSS_API       mechanism on the client and both sides agree on using this mechanism,
       the client side has to be eligible to non-interactively gain session
       keys for the 
audit/<host_fqdn>@<REALM> principal from the Kerberos
       KDC/TGS. At the same time the identity running the audit server
       application has to have the long term keys associated with the       
audit/<host_fqdn>@<REALM> principal stored in the 
keytab file
       (
krb5.conf(5)) to be able to decrypt the session keys.
       The 
audit_remote plugin initiates a connection to first server in the       
p_hosts list. If the connection fails or audit record sends are not
       responded to in 
p_timeout seconds, after 
p_retries attempts the
       plugin tries to connect to the next server. If the connection to the
       last server fails, the plugin retries to connect to the first host in
       the list.  
audit_warn(8) is executed at every unsuccessful attempt to
       connect to the server or send timeout with the plugin option plugin       
audit_remote.so retry <count> <error>.<error> is connection       
<host:port> <the network error>. An 
EPROTO network error indicates
       that the client plugin did not get a successful protocol version
       handshake.
   PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
       All protocol messages are preceded by the 4 octets of the size of the
       data to follow. This size is in network byte order.
       The protocol begins with version negotiation followed by a 
GSS-API       security context token exchange. On error the connection is closed
       (and any output token optionally sent).
       The version negotiation takes place in the clear with the plugin
       sending an octet array of the comma (
,) separated list of versions
       supported. The current version number is the characters 
01. The
       receiver is expected to respond with the version that they accept (in
       the current case that is the characters 
01). A mismatch is considered
       an error and the connection is closed.
       The version octet array sent by the plugin and the version characters
       accepted by the receiver are concatenated together to make up the
       application data field of the channel bindings of the GSS security
       context establishment.
         <plugin version characters> || <server accepted version characters>"
         ||" represents concatenation
       Subsequent tokens contain a 64 bit sequence number in network byte
       order and a single audit record (
audit.log(5)); the client uses
       confidentiality protection. wrap (64 bit sequence number || audit
       record)
       The server acknowledges the receipt (and is then responsible for any
       data loss) with the received 64 bit sequence number and a MIC token
       of the unwrapped 64 bit sequence number and audit record. MIC
       verification on the client side acknowledges the audit record can be
       freed and not saved for possible retransmission.
         64 bit sequence number || mic (64 bit sequence number || audit record)
       Secure remote audit client/server communication flow:
         1) Client <--> Server - TCP handshake
         2) Client <--> Server - protocol version negotiation:
            a) Client  --> Server - send data size - uint32_t value (2)
            b) Client  --> Server - send clear text message of the versions
                                    supported comma separated, e.g.,
                                    "01,02,03" for versions 1 and 2 and 3.
                                    The only version supported at present is
                                    "01"
            c) Client <--  Server - send data size - uint32_t value (2)
            d) Client <--  Server - send clear text version selected
                                    ("01")
            :no version match; close connection; try next host
         3) Security context initiation:
            a) Client - Construct channel bindings application data value
                        (4 octets "0101")
            b) Client  --> Server - send token (data) size - uint32_t value
            c) Client  --> Server - GSS-API per-context token
            d) Client <--  Server - send token (data) size
            e) Client <--  Server - GSS-API per-context token
               :repeat a-e until security context is initialized; if unsuccessful,
               close connection; try next host
         4) Client - transmit thread, when audit record to be sent:
            a) Client  --> Server - send data size
            b) Client  --> Server - GSS-API per-message token
                           wrap (sequence number || audit record)
               :repeat a-b while less than max (qsize) outstanding records
          5) Client - receive thread:
             a) Client <--  Server - receive data size - uint32_t value
             b) Client <--  Server - receive sequence number - uint64_t value
             c) Client <--  Server - receive MIC
             d) Client             - MIC verification - OK
             e) Client             - remove particular audit record
                                     pointed by the sequence number from the
                                     retransmit buffer
           :repeat a-e, on error close connection; try next host;
            retransmit unacknowledged audit records
         6) Server - receive thread:
             a) Client  --> Server - receive data size
             b) Client  --> Server - GSS-API receive, uwrap, store
                            per-message token
         7) Server - transmit thread:
             a) Server - MIC generation - message integrity code
                             mic (sequence number || audit record)
             b) Client <--  Server - send data size
             c) Client < -- Server - send sequence number
             d) Client <--  Server - send MIC
EXAMPLES
       Example 1: Activating audit_remote.so and Specifying attributes
       The following commands cause 
audit_remote.so to be activated and set
       the 
p_retries and 
p_timeout attributes. Note that using       
auditconfig(8) only allows one attribute to be set at a time.
         # auditconfig -setplugin audit_remote active p_retries=2
         # auditconfig -setplugin audit_remote active p_timeout=90
       Example 2: Activating audit_remote.so and Specifying the Remote Audit
       Servers
       The following command causes 
audit_remote.so to be activated and
       specifies the remote audit servers to where the audit records are
       sent. The 
kerberos_v5 security mechanism is defined to be used when
       communicating with the servers.
         # auditconfig -setplugin audit_remote active \
         p_hosts=eggplant.eng.example.com::kerberos_v5,\
         purple.ebay.example.com:4592:kerberos_v5
       Example 3: Using the Configuration of Usage Default Security Mechanism
       The following example shows the configuration of usage of default
       security mechanism. It also shows use of default port on one of the
       configured servers:
         # auditconfig -setplugin audit_remote active \
         p_hosts=jedger.eng.example.com,\
         jbadams.ebay.example.com:4592
ATTRIBUTES
       See 
attributes(7) for a description of the following attributes:
       +--------------------+-----------------+
       |  ATTRIBUTE TYPE    | ATTRIBUTE VALUE |
       +--------------------+-----------------+
       |MT Level            | MT-Safe         |
       +--------------------+-----------------+
       |Interface Stability | See below.      |
       +--------------------+-----------------+
       The plugin configuration parameters are Committed. The client/server
       protocol (version 
"01") is Contracted Project Private. See       
audit.log(5) for the audit record format and content stability.
SEE ALSO
       gss_accept_sec_context(3GSS), 
gss_get_mic(3GSS),       
gss_init_sec_context(3GSS), 
gss_unwrap(3GSS), 
gss_wrap(3GSS),       
libgss(3LIB), 
libsocket(3LIB), 
getipnodebyname(3SOCKET),       
getservbyname(3XNET), 
tcp(4P), 
audit.log(5), 
krb5.conf(5), 
mech(5),       
attributes(7), 
kerberos(7), 
audit_warn(8), 
auditconfig(8), 
auditd(8)NOTES
       audit_remote authenticates itself to the remote audit service by way
       of GSS-API (
libgss(3LIB)). Default gss credentials are used as
       provided by the 
gss implementation mechanism, such as Kerberos.
       The 
solaris-audit service port assigned by IANA is 
16162.
                              November 22, 2021              AUDIT_REMOTE(7)